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Abstract 
We report boundary experiments testing the robustness of price convergence in double auction 
markets for non-durable goods in which there is extreme earnings inequality at the competitive 
equilibrium (CE). Following up on a conjecture by Smith (1976a), we test whether the well-known 
equilibrating power of the double auction institution is robust to the presence of complete information 
about traders’ values and costs and the presence of symmetric market power. We find that complete 
information is insufficient to impede convergence to CE prices; however, introducing market power 
consistently causes prices to deviate from the CE, whether or not subjects possess complete 
information. Our design highlights the value of boundary experiments in understanding how market 
institutions shape behavior, and our findings help delineate the limits of the double auction institution 
to generate competitive outcomes. 
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A market, then, is theoretically perfect only when all traders have perfect knowledge of the 
conditions of supply and demand, and the consequent ratio of exchange […] So essential is a 
knowledge of the real state of supply and demand to the smooth procedure of trade and the 
real good of the community, that I conceive it would be quite legitimate to compel the 
publication of any requisite statistics. 
W.S. Jevons (1871) 
If the reader bristles at the acceptance of assumptions such as perfect knowledge [...] He is right 
if he believes these extreme assumptions are not necessary to the existence of competition [...] 
The reason for not stating the weakest assumptions (necessary conditions) for competition is 
that they are difficult to formulate, and in fact are not known precisely. 
G.L. Stigler (1966) 
One of the most prominent, replicable, empirical properties of the double auction competitive 
price mechanism is its rapid convergence to the supply and demand equilibrium under the 
condition of incomplete information […] It might be supposed that under complete information, 
where each agent is informed of the value and cost functions of other agents, market 
convergence would improve, or at minimum not be worse […] [T]here is at least one class of 
crucial experiments for which this proposition must be rejected, namely the class in which all the 
exchange surplus is obtained by the buyers (or sellers) at the equilibrium price. 
V.L. Smith (1980) 
1. Introduction 
Probably the most widely replicated experiment in economics shows the power of the continuous 
double auction institution to generate competitive equilibrium (CE) allocations of non-durable goods. 
Beginning with Smith (1962), experiments have shown that even markets composed of inexperienced 
traders, possessing incomplete information about supply and demand, rapidly converge to the CE after 
only a few market repetitions. This striking result has been subjected to a number of powerful stress 
tests, yet the convergence properties of the double auction remain robust. In particular, convergence 
is robust to variation in the number of buyers and sellers (e.g. this number need only be greater than 
two; see Smith, 1981, Smith, Williams, 1990), to within-session changes in the supply and demand 
arrays, and to both computerized and hand-run implementation; see (Davis and Holt, 1993) for a 
survey of the classic literature. 
In a particularly rigorous stress test, Smith (1965) provides evidence that equilibrium is still achieved in 
a so-called “swastika” supply and demand array. In such a market (see Fig. 1), all the exchange surplus 
goes to one side of the market at the CE price.1 As Smith (1982b) and Holt et al. (1986) note, such a 
supply and demand environment provides a uniquely stringent test of the equilibrating capabilities of 
the double auction since there exists a continuum of prices that support efficient, though non-
competitive, allocations. Nevertheless, Smith, 1965, Smith, 1982b, and Holt et al. (1986) all report that 
such markets converge to the CE. This result has also been replicated in a number of studies, all of 
which (to the best of our knowledge) are summarized in Table 1, which provides references and 
catalogues the institutional details of each session. 
Fig. 1. Market with all surplus obtained by buyers at the CE. 
Table 1. Summary of previous research. 











Smith (1965) Session 
1 




















No Yes 4 Yes (8) Single 11 & 19 $0.05 Soft 
Smith (1976b) Exp. 1 No Yes 4 Yes (5) Single 11 & 16 $0.05 Soft  
Exp. 2 No Yes 4 Yes (5) Single 11 & 16 $0.05 Soft  
Exp. 4 Yes Yes 4 Yes (5) Single 11 & 16 $0.05 Soft  
Exp. 5 No Yes 4 Yes (8) Single 11 & 19 $0.05 Soft  
Exp. 6 No Yes 4 Yes (8) Single 11 & 19 $0.05 Soft  
Exp. 7 Yes Yes 4 Yes (8) Single 11 & 19 $0.05 Soft 
Smith (1976a) Figure 
7a 
No Yes 4 Yes (5) Single 11 & 19 $0.05 Soft 
Smith (1980) Figure 
5d 




No/Yes Yes 3/2 Yes (8) Single 11 & 19 $0.05 Soft 
Smith (1982a) Figure 4 No No 5/5 Yes/No 
(5) 
Mult. 4 & 4 $0.10 Hard 
Holt et al. (1986) Exp. 1 No No 5/5 No/Yes 
(5) 
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No Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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No Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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No Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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No Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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No Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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No Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
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Yes Yes 11/11 No/Yes 
(5) 
Mult. 4 & 4 $0.00 Both 
Notes: The table contains all “swastika” design experiments with paid subjects. A slash indicates switchover in information 
or excess supply to excess demand. In all cases except (Kachelmeier and Shehata, 1992), total available surplus was $1.10. 
Bold text indicates that the session provided traders complete information on supply and demand in at least some of the 
trading periods. When the closing rule is listed as “Both”, this is because there was a hard close, but if offers ceased before 
the time limit was reached, a soft closing rule was used instead. 
aThe authors state that they replicate the design of Smith and Williams (1990) (which was originally reported in a 1983 
working paper), but they do not mention a commission value. We assume that they also replicated this feature of the 
design. 
As noted in Smith, 1980, Smith, 1982a, Smith, 1982b, the fact that such markets converge to CE 
allocations—despite traders having incomplete information about supply and demand conditions—is a 
challenge for neoclassical theories of competition.2 Few, perhaps none, of the critical theoretical 
conditions for the existence of a CE are satisfied in the double auction markets in Table 1. In these 
markets there are few traders, each possessing incomplete information, bidding and asking to make 
(as opposed to take) their own prices. Yet these markets reliably converge to the CE. It is thus all the 
more surprising that in four early experiments reported by Vernon Smith in Table 1, when traders were 
actually provided complete information about supply and demand, the double auction no longer 
reliably converged! In a slightly different institutional environment, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) 
also report weaker price convergence to the CE when traders have complete information.3 
Smith (1980) remarks that in adjusting an experimental trading environment nearer to the conditions 
that generate a theoretical CE, it is natural to suppose that “market convergence would improve, or at 
minimum not be worse” in practice (p. 357). Nevertheless, in the sessions highlighted in bold in 
Table 1, the evidence suggests otherwise. Fig. 2 shows data from Smith (1980). The figure contains two 
excess supply, “swastika” design sessions with complete and incomplete information. In Fig. 2a, we see 
that after four trading periods, the two sessions in which traders’ values and costs are private 
information have converged to (or very close to) the CE outcome. 
Fig. 2. Previous complete information experiments, 5 units excess. 
However, in Fig. 2b, the first panel reveals little sign of convergence. The second panel, with two 
periods of incomplete information followed by two periods of complete information, provides limited 
evidence of (near) price convergence after an initial spike in prices following the introduction of 
complete information. Fig. 3 shows that this pattern also presents in experiments with an excess 
supply of 8 rather than 5 units. Smith (1982b) notes that “in this supply and demand design, complete 
information means that both buyers and sellers are aware of the extreme asymmetry in the gains from 
exchange at prices near the C.E. Consequently, sellers hold out for higher prices […] Similarly, buyers 
bid higher or accept higher offers, perhaps because of egalitarian motives or because they do not want 
to risk failing to make a contract” (p. 946). 
Fig. 3. Previous complete information experiments, 8 units excess. 
The experiments by Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) support Smith’s observations, and together these 
experiments suggest that providing traders with complete information in the double auction can 
impede convergence to the CE. On the other hand, while (Smith, 1982b) highlights possible strategic 
behavior as a source of non-convergence, the market environment studied in all these sessions is not 
conducive to non-competitive outcomes because such outcomes require coordinated collusive 
behavior on the part of multiple traders. No single trader has market power, and thus this design may 
not give non-competitive outcomes their best shot. 
Indeed, in one of the few other papers to provide evidence of double auction markets for non-durables 
that fail to converge to the CE, Holt et al. (1986) introduce supply and demand arrays with asymmetric 
market power in which a single trader may withhold marginal units to raise the price. A replication by 
Davis and Williams (1991) confirms these results in double auction markets and shows that similar 
patterns are observed in a posted-offer market.4 
In light of the evidence that both complete information and market power may impede convergence to 
CE prices and allocations in laboratory markets, and since market power is a plausible feature of many 
non-laboratory markets, it is valuable to further investigate the effects of these market characteristics. 
In this paper, we provide new tests of the robustness of CE convergence in the double auction to the 
presence of complete information about supply and demand and to the presence of market power. We 
study the double auction because of its well known equilibrating properties. We design a boundary 
experiment (a lá Smith, 1982b) in which a small number of traders (4 buyers and 4 sellers), each 
completely informed about the conditions of supply and demand, trade in a double auction market 
with a “swastika” supply and demand setup that generates extreme earnings inequity at the CE 
allocation. We compare our results to previous experiments by Smith and Williams (1990) using similar 
supply and demand arrays, but wherein traders have incomplete information. We also report 
treatments that vary whether traders possess market power—meaning that they can potentially 
withhold units from the market to profitably influence prices. Taken together, our experiments probe 
the boundaries of the double auction’s capacity to generate CE allocations. 
We observe fairly robust price convergence to the CE under conditions of complete information, 
absent market power. Thus, we provide new evidence of the striking equilibrating capacity of the 
double auction, even when subjects are aware of the extreme inequality in earnings at the CE. 
However, when traders possess complete information and market power, prices and quantities more 
readily deviate from the CE. A followup treatment retains market power but provides traders with 
incomplete information as in the standard double auction environment. This allows us to identify 
whether it is the joint effect of complete information and market power that causes deviations from 
the CE or whether market power alone is sufficient to impede convergence. In this treatment, we still 
observe price and quantity deviations from CE, suggesting that market power (and not complete 
information) is responsible for the observed failures of convergence. The addition of complete 
information seems only to alter the division of the exchange surplus. 
2. Experimental design 
Our experiment is designed to answer three questions:  
1. Does complete information impede convergence to the competitive equilibrium in a double 
auction? 
2. Does this depend on the presence of market power? 
3. What is the interaction between market information and market power? 
Given the voluminous literature on the convergence properties of the double auction for non-durables 
under incomplete information, we do not conduct our own control treatment. Instead, we rely on 
existing experimental evidence to provide the background against which we test our new design. To 
this end, we base our own design on six experiments reported in Smith and Williams (1990). These 
experiments are an especially strong test of market convergence to the CE, because they feature a 
small number of buyers and sellers and extreme earnings inequity in equilibrium, both of which may 
interfere with CE convergence.5 
The six experiments in Smith and Williams (1990) are computerized, incomplete information double 
auctions with a “swastika” supply and demand setup. Four buyers and four sellers (with previous 
double auction experience) interact for a total of 10 trading periods, broken up into two 5 period 
“weeks.” In half the sessions (Sessions 1, 3, and 5), there is excess demand of 5 units in Week 1, and 
excess supply of 5 units in Week 2. In the remaining sessions (Sessions 2, 4, and 6), there is excess 
supply of 5 units in Week 1, and excess demand of 5 units in Week 2. The per unit exchange surplus is 
always $1.10, with an additional $0.10 commission going to both buyer and seller on each transacted 
unit. 
Fig. 4 presents the Smith and Williams data. In Sessions 1, 3, and 5 , the CE price is shown as the lower 
dashed line during Week 1 and the higher dashed line in Week 2. In Sessions 2, 4, and 6 the CE price is 
indicated by the higher dashed line in Week 1 and the lower dashed line in Week 2. The CE market 
quantity is always 11 units, regardless of period or week. 
Fig. 4. Experiments from Smith and Williams (1990). 
From Fig. 4 we see that transaction prices converged to the equilibrium price in all six sessions by 
period 5 of Week 1 (period 4 of Week 1 in the case of Session 4). Note also that market efficiency 
(market quantity divided by 11 units) was 100% in all but 2 of the 30 trading periods. The Smith and 
Williams data are striking; despite incomplete information, CE convergence is clearly visible with excess 
supply (or demand) of 5 units. 
Here we note that the Smith and Williams (1990) experiments indicate that five trading periods in a 
fixed economic environment provide ample time for subjects to learn about their market, and for 
prices to potentially equilibrate. In our new sessions, four buyers and four sellers interact over five 
periods in a fixed environment with excess supply (or excess demand) and complete information about 
supply and demand. We now provide additional details about our experiments. 
2.1. The institution 
In our experiments, buyers and sellers trade in an oral double auction. Subjects are given record sheets 
containing their values (or costs) for each trading period (see Appendix C). The experimenter plays the 
role of auctioneer and accepts oral bids from buyers and oral asks from sellers.6 A research assistant 
inputs bids and asks into a computer as they arrive. These bids and asks are displayed in real-time on a 
projected screen in the center of the room; see Fig. 5. All messages must be sent through the 
experimenter, and cross-talk is expressly forbidden. 
Fig. 5. Screenshot of the projected double auction interface. 
A trading period opens with an initial bid from a buyer or an initial ask from a seller. Bids and asks must 
be multiples of $0.10 (to reduce transactions costs). Any subsequent bid or ask must improve upon the 
current standing bid or ask. Bids and asks continue until one side of the market accepts a price offered 
by the other side of the market, thus initiating a binding contract. Following a transaction, the order 
book is cleared, and trading reopens with the solicitation of a new initial bid or ask. The trading period 
continues until there is no further market activity (i.e. we utilize a “soft close”); this closely follows the 
4 markets conducted by Smith noted in Table 1 above.7 
2.2. The environment and our treatments 
In our markets, four buyers and four sellers each seek to trade multiple units of a commodity. All 
buyers value their units at $17.70, and all sellers face make-to-order unit costs of $15.40. In addition, 
every trader receives a commission of $0.25 per unit traded. We vary aspects of the economic 
environment to identify the effects of complete information and market power on convergence to the 
competitive equilibrium. 
2.2.1. Complete information 
Our first two treatments closely follow the environment in Smith and Williams (1990). In our Dx5 (read: 
“excess demand of 5 units”) and Sx5 sessions, the supply and demand arrays induce, respectively, 
excess demand and excess supply of 5 units. In Dx5 (Sx5) four buyers (sellers) can each trade four units, 
while three sellers (buyers) each have three units to trade and one seller (buyer) has two units to 
trade. The primary difference between our design and that of Smith and Williams is that in our markets 
traders possess complete information about supply and demand.8 Thus, our treatments will allow us to 
see whether complete information impedes convergence in markets that are closely comparable to the 
experimental markets reported in Smith and Williams (1990). 
Before discussing our market power treatments, we note that there is no strong theoretical reason to 
expect differences in CE convergence in a world of excess demand compared to a world of excess 
supply. Despite this, previous experiments suggest that subjects may be “better at” being buyers. In 
the double auction literature, buyers tend to earn an outsized share of the gains from trade along the 
path to convergence (see e.g. Smith and Williams, 1982). Our design examines both excess demand 
and excess supply markets, so it allows for the possibility that buyers and sellers may differ in the 
effectiveness with which they attempt to influence prices. 
2.2.2. Market power 
We now discuss two treatments that introduce market power via a subtle change in the underlying 
supply and demand configuration. Specifically, in our Dx1 and Sx1 sessions, the supply and demand 
arrays induce an excess demand (supply) of only 1 unit. In Dx1 (Sx1), four buyers (sellers) each still have 
four units to trade, but now three sellers (buyers) each have four units to trade, while a single seller 
(buyer) has only three units to trade. In other words, the supply and demand arrays for Dx1 and Sx1 
take the arrays from Dx5 and Sx5 and simply increase the quantity supplied by each seller in Dx5 and 
the quantity demanded by each buyer in Sx5, by one unit. As we explain below, this change creates 
incentives for strategic withholding by buyers in Dx1 and by sellers in Sx1. 
Holt et al. (1986) define “market power” as the ability of a buyer (seller) to unilaterally, profitably 
lower (raise) the market price by restricting demand (supply), where no seller (buyer) can profitably 
respond by counter-withholding. In their environment, there are five buyers and five sellers, and the 
market does not have a “swastika” supply and demand configuration. Importantly, market power in 
their design is asymmetric, in that only two of the five buyers (sellers) can profitably affect the market 
by withholding units. Moreover, counter-withholding is not possible. 
In contrast to Holt et al. (1986), in our design, market power is symmetric. All four of our Dx1 buyers 
(Sx1 sellers) can potentially, profitably withhold units. Moreover, if Dx1 buyers (Sx1 sellers) withhold, 
traders on the other side of the market can potentially, profitably counter-withhold. To see how 
market power might be exercised, consider Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6. Withholding examples. 
In panel 6 a, which represents the market conditions in Dx5, each buyer has 4 units of demand, but 
excess demand totals 5 units. Because of this, a single buyer withholding units (and thereby shifting the 
inverse demand curve from D to D′) is unable to affect the competitive equilibrium. In other words, a 
buyer cannot profitably lower the market (CE) price by withholding demand; no buyer can exercise 
market power. 
Now consider panel 6 b, which represents the market conditions in Dx1. Here a single buyer 
withholding units is able to influence the CE in the market. With our parameterization, any Dx1 buyer 
would rather buy two units for a commission-inclusive surplus of $5.10, than buy three units or four 
units for a commission-inclusive surplus of $0.75 or $1.00. However, if a Dx1 buyer’s withholding 
strategy implies an inverse demand curve of D′, any seller whose profit is affected by the buyer’s 
actions finds it profitable to counter-withhold—thus shifting the supply curve to S′ in panel 6b. 
As noted in Holt (1989) (see also Davis and Williams, 1991): “[T]he Nash equilibrium for a single market 
period, whatever this equilibrium may look like, cannot involve quantity withholding; it is always best 
to sell inframarginal units at the last instant […] [Q]uantity reductions in an ODA [oral double auction] 
setting can only be motivated by dynamic considerations.” The key implication is that the Nash 
Equilibrium of the repeated double auction with market power does not correspond to the CE. 
Strategic withholding may be profitable over the 5 trading periods of our market power treatments, 
and any withholding strategy will cause deviations from the CE. We do not attempt to calculate the 
Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies (since our main objective is to compare observed outcomes to the 
CE), but the point remains that the subtle change in supply and demand from x5 to x1 provides scope 
for market power to impede convergence to the CE. 
Because we are aware of no previous double auction experiments with “swastika” supply and demand 
arrays and market power, we also conduct an incomplete information version of Dx1 which we refer to 
as iDx1 (the i denotes incomplete information). In iDx1 all buyers’ values and sellers’ costs are private 
information.9 This treatment allows us to determine whether any price convergence consequences of 
the Dx1 and Sx1 treatments are driven by complete information or the joint presence of both complete 
information and market power. 
2.2.3. Switchover 
Another striking feature of the Smith and Williams (1990) experiments is that, after 5 periods of trading 
in an excess demand (supply) environment, the authors introduce a subtle change in parameters to 
create a symmetric excess supply (demand) environment, so that the new equilibrium assigns the 
entire surplus at the CE to the opposite side of the market as in the first 5 periods. This subtle change 
consists of changing the quantity demanded or supplied by each trader, but it provides an additional 
sharp test of CE convergence in the double auction. Such “switchover” sessions provide an answer to 
the question: “Do prices generated by the double institution quickly adjust to a change in parameters 
that changes the competitive equilibrium?” In the case of Smith and Williams, the answer is 
unequivocally yes (see Fig. 4). 
We conduct our own Switchover sessions; two sessions with excess demand-to-excess supply (one with 
an excess of 1 unit; the other with an excess of 5 units), and two sessions with excess supply-to-excess 
demand (again, one with an excess of 1 unit; the other with an excess of 5 units). We refer to these 
sessions as DSx1, DSx5, SDx1, and SDx5. 
The switchover is conducted as a surprise restart. At the conclusion of 5 trading periods, new record 
sheets inducing the new supply and demand are handed out, a brief instruction period provides 
complete information about the new supply and demand arrays, and trade resumes following the 
same procedures as before. 
Our Switchover sessions allow us to examine the responsiveness of prices to changes in the underlying 
market configuration. Because previous experiments have shown that prices exhibit a hysteresis effect, 
that is, they lag in the transition from one equilibrium to another (see e.g. Figs. 1 & 2 in Smith, 1980), 
we have reason to believe that “switching over” to a new CE configuration may exaggerate any 
observed non-convergent tendencies. 
2.3. Procedures 
These experiments were conducted between September 2016 and February 2017 at Simon Fraser 
University. The sessions took between 60 and 120 minutes depending on the treatment. Subjects 
received paper copies of the instructions (See Appendix A for the instructions) which were read aloud 
by the experimenter. During the instruction period, examples were given showing how to compute 
earnings and how to conduct trade in the market. Subjects were dispersed around the experiment 
room to prevent cross-talk and were explicitly told not to engage in such talk. After concluding the 
experiment, subjects completed a brief questionnaire and then were paid privately and dismissed. See 
Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire and Table B1 for a summary of responses. 
Subjects were recruited online from the general student body. Prior to the study, no subject had 
experience trading in an incentivized oral double auction market. Subjects received a payment of $7.00 
for arriving to the session on time. This show-up payment, plus their cumulative earnings from all 
trading periods, was paid to them in cash at the conclusion of the session. Salient payments ranged 
from $1.00 to $93.50. All payments were made in CAD. Table 2 summarizes the experimental design; 
cf. Table 1 for a comparison to the literature. 
Table 2. Summary of sessions. 










Dx5 3 Yes Yes 5 No (5) Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
Sx5 3 Yes Yes 5 Yes (5) Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
Dx1 3 Yes Yes 5 No (1) Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
iDx1a 4 No Yes 5 No (1) Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
Sx1 3 Yes Yes 5 Yes (1) Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
SDx1 1 Yes Yes 5/5 Yes/No 
(1) 
Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
DSx1 1 Yes Yes 5/3 No/Yes 
(1) 
Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
SDx5 1 Yes Yes 5/5 Yes/No 
(5) 
Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
DSx5 1 Yes Yes 5/5 No/Yes 
(5) 
Mult. 4 & 4 $0.25 Soft 
Notes: A slash indicates switchover in excess supply to excess demand. In all cases total available surplus/unit 
was $2.30. 
aIn all but two sessions, the vertical axis in Fig. 5 stretched from $0–$20. In the last two iDx1 sessions, the axis 
stretched from $0–$30. 
3. Results 
To briefly summarize our main results, in this section we report evidence of price convergence to the 
CE under complete information in the absence of market power. However, with market power, prices 
persistently deviate from the CE, and efficiency is reduced. Our incomplete information treatment with 
market power also exhibits non-convergence suggesting that it is market power, and not complete 
information, driving our results. We also report limited evidence of hysteresis in our switchover 
sessions without market power, though we observe striking persistence of prices after the switchover 
with market power. Finally, we observe little evidence of individual behavior consistent with strategic 
withholding. 
3.1. Price convergence 
Figs. 7 and 8 display the supply and demand arrays (and resulting CE prices) and time series of 
transaction prices for the x5 (no market power) and x1 (market power) treatments, respectively. While 
we conducted only 3 sessions of each treatment, we had four additional “switchover” sessions in each 
of which the first 5 periods were identical to one of our main treatments. We report these first 5 
periods as Session 4 in Figs. 7 and 8. For clarity, we display equilibrium prices both ignoring and 
accounting for the $0.25 commission. References to CE prices in what follows will be to the CE price 
ignoring traders’ commissions. The upper panels (a) and (b) show prices from all trading periods in 
each session, and the lower panels (c) and (d) show only transactions in the final trading period of each 
session. The latter figures reveal whether prices have converged by the end of each session, after 
subjects have gained some trading experience. 
 
Fig. 7. The Dx5 and Sx5 Sessions. 
Note: In Dx5, Session 2, Period 5, prices of $19.00 and $20.00 are graphed at $18.85. 
 
Fig. 8. The Dx1 and Sx1 Sessions. 
Note: In Sx1, Session 4, Period 1, a price of $5.00 is graphed at $14.45. 
As can be seen in the top two panels of Fig. 7, prices generally converge toward the CE over time, 
though they appear to do so more quickly in the treatment with excess supply. By the final period of 
trading, nearly all transaction prices are at or close to the CE price in both x5 treatments. Evidence of 
price convergence is much weaker in Fig. 8. In fact, panel (a) reveals that only 5 of 274 (1.8%) Dx1 
transaction prices are at or above the CE price. While prices are closer to the CE in Sx1, only Session 1 
has units trade at or below the CE price in period 5. 
Table 3 reports summary statistics on prices, quantities, and efficiencies by treatment; the left side of 
the Table reports averages for all periods and the right side just for period 5. Consistent with the 
figures, average transaction price is lower (i.e. further from the CE) in the excess demand treatments 
when buyers have market power than when they do not (by the equivalent of 22% of total surplus). 
Similarly, average transaction price is higher, and hence further from the CE, with market power under 
excess supply (by the equivalent of 11% of total surplus). 
Table 3. Summary statistics by treatment. 
 
All periods Period 5 only 
Treatment 𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃∗  𝑄𝑄    𝑄𝑄 𝑄𝑄∗� (%) 𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃∗  𝑄𝑄    𝑄𝑄 𝑄𝑄∗� (%)       
Dx5 17.19 −0.53 10.85 98.64 17.76 0.06 10.50 95.45 






Sx5 15.48 0.08 9.80 89.09 15.44 0.04 10.75 97.73 






Notes: 𝑃𝑃 is the average transaction price of all units transacted in a treatment. All prices are denominated in 
CAD. 𝑄𝑄 is the average market quantity in a period, in a treatment. 
 
We employ mixed effects regression analysis of transaction price deviation from the CE to provide 
statistical support for the foregoing observations on price convergence. More specifically, we estimate 
the following specification separately for the excess demand and excess supply treatments:10 
(1)  
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1Unit𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3MktPower𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 × MktPower𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Unit𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
In the specification, Pijt is the price of unit i in period t of session j. 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ is the CE price in session j.11 
Unitijt is the transaction number (1 through the number of units sold) in the trading period, divided by 
the equilibrium number of transactions; this controls for a within-period trend in prices. The variable tj 
is the trading period t in session j, which controls for a trend across trading periods, and MktPowerj is a 
market power treatment dummy. Also, μj denotes the jth session-specific random effect, ν0jt denotes 
the nested random effect of the tth period within the jth session, and ϵijt is the remaining error. We 
cluster standard errors at the session level. The regression output from estimating model (1) is 
reported in Table 4. 
Table 4. Regression analysis of price convergence. 
 
Dx5 Dx1 Sx5 Sx1 
Period 1 −1.43*** −1.54*** 0.23 0.44 
Period 2 −1.06*** −1.36*** 0.19 0.41* 
Period 3 −0.69*** −1.19*** 0.16 0.38** 
Period 4 −0.33*** −1.01*** 0.12 0.35*** 
Period 5 0.04 −0.83*** 0.08 0.32*** 
Notes: The estimates are 𝛽𝛽0� for Dx5 and Sx5 and 𝛽𝛽0� + 𝛽𝛽3� for Dx1 and Sx1 plus multiples of 𝛽𝛽2� and 𝛽𝛽4� for each period. 
Significance stars are from Wald tests of the hypothesis that the relevant coefficients sum to 0: *** p  <  0.01, ** p  <  0.05, 
* p  <  0.1. 
 
In Table 4, note that Dx5 prices deviate from the CE initially, but converge over time. Dx5 prices are 
statistically indistinguishable from the CE by period 5. In the Sx5 treatment, prices are statistically 
indistinguishable from the CE in the first period of trading and remain so in all subsequent periods. In 
Dx1 and Sx1, where the exercise of market power is possible, prices are statistically different from the 
CE in all periods save for Period 1 of Sx1. Finally, we see evidence that prices converge faster under 
excess supply than excess demand in our x5 treatments and that prices tend to be further from the CE 
under excess demand than excess supply in our x1 treatments.  
Finding 1 
With complete information, prices converge to the CE when buyers (sellers) do not have market power. 
Finding 2 
When buyers (or sellers) have market power, prices fail to converge to the CE price under complete 
information. 
Finding 3 
With or without market power, prices are slower to converge or further from the CE when there is 
excess demand than when there is excess supply. 
Finding 1 suggests that Smith’s conjecture in our epigraph and the results of the four complete 
information sessions reported in Smith (1980) are not entirely robust. In our experiments, we find solid 
evidence of price convergence under complete information, so long as buyers do not possess market 
power.12Finding 2 extends the findings of Holt et al. (1986) and Davis and Williams (1990) to markets in 
which buyers and sellers possess complete information. Finding 3 is consistent with the observation in 
Smith and Williams (1982) that subjects are “better at” being buyers, in that buyers tend to earn a 
relatively larger share of the surplus than sellers in double auction markets. This seems to carry over to 
environments with market power, as buyers in Dx1 drives prices further from the CE than do sellers in 
Sx1. 
3.2. Efficiency 
In previous research, one consequence of the robust equilibrating tendency of the continuous double 
auction is the institution’s ready ability to generate efficient resource allocations. We have just seen 
that CE prices emerged in our x5 treatments, but not in our x1 treatments with market power. As 
noted above, the failure of our market power sessions to yield CE prices may, or may not, affect 
allocative efficiency; there exists a continuum of mutually acceptable prices that simply alter the 
distribution of the gains from exchange without impacting efficiency. We now examine whether the 
introduction of market power reduces allocative efficiency. 
Table 3 shows the average number of units transacted per trading period, by treatment. First, as 
shown in Figs. 7 and 8 subjects transacted fewer than the efficient number of units in a sizable share of 
all trading periods. Specifically, fewer than Q* units were sold in 50% of trading periods in which 
market power was present (10/20 in both Dx1 and Sx1) versus only 25% of periods in which traders 
possessed no market power (8/20 periods in Sx5 and 2/20 in Dx5). Thus, with both excess supply and 
excess demand, the presence of market power reduced the number of periods in which the efficient 
quantity was traded. 
We measure efficiency as the number of units transacted divided by the CE quantity. Since the 
available exchange surplus is constant for each unit in our design, this is equivalent to the popular 
(Plott and Smith, 1978) measure of efficiency: observed total surplus over possible total surplus. Note 
that this means that our design maximizes the efficiency loss from withholding a unit at the CE.13 
Efficiency is 99% in the Dx5 treatment, suggesting that complete information does not necessarily 
interfere with market efficiency in the absence of market power. However, efficiency hovers around 
90% in the other three treatments.14 To test for treatment differences in efficiency, we estimate the 
following mixed effects specification separately for the excess demand and excess supply treatments 
(analogous to the analysis above):  
(2)  
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2MktPower𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 × MktPower𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇0𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇1𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖∗⁄  is efficiency in period t of session j. The variable tj is the trading period t in session j, which 
controls for a trend across trading periods, and MktPowerj is a market power treatment dummy. Also, 
μ0j denotes the jth session-specific random effect, μ1j denotes the nested random effect of the tth 
period within the jth session, and ϵjt is the remaining error. We cluster standard errors at the session 
level. 
Table 5 contains results from estimating Eq. (2). The analysis reveals that efficiency differs significantly 
from 100% in all treatments but Dx5.15 This effect is mitigated over market periods in both excess 
supply treatments, but is not mitigated in Dx1. The reported estimates for Dx1 are not in error; the 
coefficient estimate on t and that on t × MktPower are very similar but of opposite sign. 
Table 5. Regression analysis of efficiency. 
 
Dx5 Dx1 Sx5 Sx1 
Period 1 1.01 0.91*** 0.84** 0.82*** 
Period 2 1.00 0.91*** 0.86** 0.86*** 
Period 3 0.99* 0.91*** 0.89* 0.91*** 
Period 4 0.98 0.91*** 0.92 0.95*** 
Period 5 0.96 0.91* 0.95 0.99 
Notes: The estimates reported are 𝛽𝛽0� for Dx5 and Sx5 and 𝛽𝛽0� + 𝛽𝛽2� for Dx1 and Sx1 plus multiples of 𝛽𝛽1� and 𝛽𝛽3� for each 
period. Significance stars are from Wald tests of the hypothesis that the relevant coefficients sum to 1: *** p  <  0.01, ** p 
 <  0.05, * p  <  0.1. 
 
The individual coefficient estimate on MktPower (?̂?𝛽2) in model (2) is for the excess demand treatments, 
and this estimate is significantly different from zero (𝑝𝑝 = 0.03) The point estimate is −0.03 for the 
excess supply treatments, which is not significantly different from zero (𝑝𝑝 = 0.80). Our regressions 
results imply that in the excess supply treatments, efficiency is initially significantly below 100% in both 
Sx5 and Sx1. Efficiency increases over time in both treatments, but more quickly in Sx5 than in Sx1.   
Finding 4 
Market power reduces efficiency in the excess demand environment under complete information. With 
or without market power, efficiency becomes indistinguishable from 100% over time in the excess 
supply environment with complete information. However, efficiency is slower to reach 100% with 
market power. 
At this point, it is unclear whether market power and complete information together hamper price 
convergence and allocative efficiency, or whether market power alone is sufficient to produce these 
results. To address this question, we now examine our iDx1 sessions which are identical to our Dx1 
sessions, but provide traders with incomplete as opposed to complete information. That is, values and 
costs are private information under iDx1. 
3.3. Incomplete information and market power 
Are the deviations from the CE price and quantity in our x1 treatments driven by market power per se, 
or by the joint presence of market power and complete information? (Holt et al., 1986) and Davis and 
Williams (1991) find evidence of price deviations from the CE in double auctions with incomplete 
information and asymmetric market power. This suggests that market power may be the primary 
driver of the findings we report above. 
To test this conjecture, we need data from incomplete information markets with symmetric market 
power. To the best of our knowledge, no one has conducted such sessions before. Thus, we report four 
sessions of an incomplete information version of our Dx1 treatment, which we call iDx1. As noted 
above, the only difference between this treatment and Dx1 is that subjects are not informed about 
other traders’ values or costs prior to trading. 
Fig. 9 displays the supply and demand arrays (and resulting CE price) and time series of transaction 
prices for iDx1. Panel (a) shows prices from all trading periods in each session, and panel (b) shows only 
prices in the final trading period of each session. Thus, panel (b) highlights whether prices have 
converged to the CE by the end of each session. 
 
 
Fig. 9. The iDx1 sessions. 
As in the Dx1 treatment, we see very little evidence of price convergence in the iDx1 treatment. None 
of the 269 transactions occurs at a price at or above the CE. In fact, in two of the sessions prices 
converge rapidly to suppliers’ costs; that is, buyers so effectively exploit their market power that prices 
are as if the environment had excess supply rather than excess demand!16 
Table 6 displays summary statistics from both the Dx1 and iDx1 treatments to facilitate comparison; as 
before we show data for all periods and for period 5 only. The average transaction price in the iDx1 
sessions is $0.89 lower (i.e. further from the CE) than in the Dx1 sessions. Table 6 also shows average 
efficiency, which was similar in both treatments. The summary data suggest that: (1) it is market power 
and not the combination of market power and complete information that hampers price convergence 
to the CE, (2) information may affect the magnitude of the price deviation which (3) may affect the 
distribution of realized surplus. 
Table 6. Summary statistics by treatment. 
 
All periods Period 5 only 
Treatment 𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃∗  𝑄𝑄    𝑄𝑄 𝑄𝑄∗� (%) 𝑃𝑃 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃∗  𝑄𝑄    𝑄𝑄 𝑄𝑄∗� (%)       
Dx1 16.67 −1.03 13.70 91.33 16.80 −0.90 13.25 88.33 
iDx1 15.78 −1.92 13.45 89.67 15.90 −1.80 14.00 93.33  
−0.89 
 
−0.25 −1.67 −0.90 
 
+0.75 +5.00 
Notes: 𝑃𝑃 is the average transaction price of all units transacted in a treatment. All prices are denominated in 
CAD. 𝑄𝑄 is the average market quantity in a period, in a treatment. 
We estimate analogs to specifications (1) and (2), but with MktPowerj replaced by a dummy for the 
incomplete information treatment (Incompletej), and using only Dx1 and iDx1 data in our estimating 
sample. For price convergence, we find that iDx1 is not significantly different from Dx1 (𝑝𝑝 = 0.536). 
The treatment effect on 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ is significant and negative in each period (all p-values  < 0.000). With 
respect to allocative efficiency, iDx1 is again not significantly different from Dx1 (𝑝𝑝 = 0.487). Finally, 
the model’s estimate of efficiency in each trading period is significantly less than 100% in periods 1–3, 
but not in periods 4 and 5. 
Finding 5 
Price deviations from the CE are driven primarily by market power, rather than complete information. 
Complete information may affect the magnitude of price deviations and thus alter the distribution of 
surplus. 
Having established that market power affects price convergence and allocative efficiency, we next ask 
how prices adjust when we change the environment within-session from one of excess demand to one 
of excess supply and vice versa. 
3.4. The switchover sessions 
We next report the findings from our four Switchover sessions. Given the small number of sessions 
(DSx5, SDx5, DSx1, and SDx1), these observations should be taken as merely suggestive. However, they 
do reinforce the evidence reported above on the role of market power in price deviations from the CE. 
Fig. 10 displays time series of the CE price and observed transaction prices for each Switchover session. 
After the 5th trading period of each Switchover session, we conduct a surprise restart, and we increase 
demand (supply) and decrease supply (demand). This changes the CE price, and flips the equilibrium 
distribution of surplus. In three of the Switchover sessions, trade continued for another 5 periods; 
unfortunately, the lengthy bidding process in the first 5 periods of DSx1 meant that there was only 
time for 3 additional periods of trade. 
 
Fig. 10. The Switchover Sessions. 
Note: In SDx1, Period 1, a price of $5.00 is graphed at $14.45. 
As shown in Fig. 10, both sessions without market power (DSx5 and SDx5) rapidly converge to the new 
equilibrium price after the switchover. This is consistent with the evidence in Smith and 
Williams (1990) from incomplete information markets and suggests that the presence of complete 
information is not sufficient to impede convergence. However, in the two sessions with market power 
(DSx1 and SDx1), we observe striking hysteresis. Post-switchover transaction prices persist at levels 
very close to those observed in the final transactions of period 5. It is as if “bargaining” in the double 
auction with market power has generated agreement upon a (roughly) fixed distribution of the surplus 
from each transaction.17 In the two sessions with market power, efficiency is nearly as high post-
switchover as in the Dx5 treatment where efficiency is approximately 99%, which means that the 
relatively equitable split of the exchange surplus comes at very little cost to efficiency in these sessions.  
Finding 6 
As inSmith and Williams (1990), after a switch from excess supply to excess demand (or vice versa), 
prices rapidly converge to the new CE in our two sessions without market power. With market power, 
prices hardly change and average prices remain similar to those observed before the switchover. 
To reiterate, our experiments highlight the robustness of the continuous double auction in achieving 
CE allocations of non-durable goods in the absence of market power. This is true even in a complete 
information environment where, in the competitive equilibrium, the surplus is captured entirely by one 
side of the market. Moreover, in our limited sample of Switchover sessions, in the absence of market 
power, we observe rapid convergence to the new CE when values and costs are changed. The 
renowned power of the double auction begins to falter only in the presence of market power. In the 
next section we attempt to unpack how exactly market power influences behavior and how changes in 
observed behavior can be traced to changes in market prices and efficiency. 
3.5. The mechanics of market power 
We begin our detailed examination of market power with summary statistics on bids and asks, by 
treatment. Two intuitive conjectures about the behavior of subjects attempting to exploit market 
power suggest themselves: in an environment of excess demand (supply), we may see bids (asks) that 
are further from the equilibrium price on average, and we may see relatively less market activity per 
unit transacted by buyers (sellers) as they attempt to withhold units. In Table 7, note that the average 
bid price was $1.60 lower as we move from Dx5 to Dx1, but that the average ask was no lower in Sx5 
than Sx1—in fact, Sx5 asks were slightly higher by $0.08. Relative to Dx5, Dx1 sellers had asks that were 
$0.43 lower on average. Curiously, Sx1 buyers lowered their bids by $0.86 on average relative to Sx5. 
Both bids and asks were lower in iDx1 relative to Dx1. 
Table 7. Summary Statistics by Treatment 
Treatment Mean bid ($) Mean ask ($) 
 
Mean bids (#) Mean asks (#) 
 
Dx5 16.70 17.73 −1.04 3.80 2.34 1.46 





Sx5 15.07 16.23 −1.16 3.10 3.85 −0.75 





Dx1 15.09 17.30 −2.21 5.18 4.51 0.66 





Notes: Mean Bid (Ask) is the average bid (ask) for each unit transacted, averaged over units transacted in a 
treatment. All prices are denominated in CAD. Mean Bids (Asks) is the average number of bids (asks) on each 
unit transacted, averaged over units transacted in a treatment. 
There were consistently more bids than asks in the complete information excess demand sessions and 
consistently more asks than bids in the excess supply sessions.18 The total number of bids and asks was 
higher in Dx1 than in Dx5, but was essentially the same in both Sx1 and Sx5.19 Overall, the summary 
statistics are not particularly penetrating for investigating the mechanics of market power, so we now 
turn to an examination of individual withholding behavior. 
3.5.1. Individual withholding 
If some buyers (or sellers) engaged in systematic withholding, we would expect them to have traded 
fewer units overall than their counterparts who did not withhold. In this section, we focus on the side 
of the market with excess capacity because those subjects earn very little at the CE and may thus wish 
to manipulate the market. In the excess demand treatments there are 16 units that buyers would like 
to purchase in a period, and in the excess supply treatments there are 16 units that sellers would like 
to sell. Given the limited capacity on the other side of the market, not all buyers and sellers will 
transact all of their units at the CE. In this subsection, we ask: Did some subjects consistently buy (or 
sell) fewer than the expected number of units at the CE? 
In a given period, a buyer in an excess demand treatment or a seller in an excess supply treatment is 
expected to trade 𝑄𝑄
∗
4
 units on average at the CE (2.75 in the x5 treatments and 3.75 in the x1 




In practice, subjects cannot trade fractional units, and some subjects trade all of their units while 
others trade fewer units. By simulating a sequence of trades in each market, we can construct a 
reference distribution for the number of units traded by each subject over the course of the 5 trading 
periods. 
To generate a reference distribution showing the expected number of units bought or sold in the CE for 
a given buyer (or seller), we simulate 5,000 repetitions of each experimental treatment. For each 
market period, we simulate a sequence of trades under a random priority assumption, such that at any 
point in the sequence of trades, all remaining units of demand (or supply) are equally likely to be 
exchanged in the subsequent transaction. This is equivalent to sampling without replacement from the 
demand (or supply) schedule until the equilibrium number of units has traded. We repeat this exercise 
five times to simulate a session of our experiment and then count the number of units traded by each 
buyer (or seller) to construct a simulated distribution for the expected total number of units bought (or 
sold) over all 5 periods of each treatment. 
We compare this simulated distribution to the empirical distribution from our experiments. For each 
buyer in the excess demand treatments and for each seller in the excess supply treatments, we 
calculate the total number of units they actually bought or sold over all 5 trading periods. These 
empirical distributions are based on 16 observations per treatment (4 subjects times 4 sessions). A 
histogram of the simulated distribution is shown in Fig. 11 for each treatment with the empirical 
distribution superposed. 
 
Fig. 11. Histograms of total units transacted. 
The figure reiterates our earlier observation that market efficiency was less than 100% in all three of 
our market power treatments because the densities of the empirical distributions lie to the left of the 
densities of the simulated distributions. We also see considerably more variance in the empirical 
distributions than in the simulated distributions. There are a few outlying individuals who traded far 
fewer units than expected in the CE, which is at least consistent with the possibility that some subjects 
systematically withheld. 
Given that we see subjects who traded far fewer units than expected at the CE in our market power 
sessions, it is natural to ask whether these subjects effectively moved prices away from the CE to their 
benefit. Pooling over the market power treatments (Sx1, Dx1, iDx1), we observe no significant 
correlation between efficiency and the mean absolute difference between observed prices and the CE 
price in a period (𝑟𝑟 = 0.16, p-value = 0.22, N = 60). 
Moreover, there is not much evidence that the most avid withholders impacted prices to their benefit. 
In Session 3 of Dx1, which contains the outlier shown in panel (a) of Fig. 11, prices were slightly further 
from equilibrium than the Dx1 average. However, in Session 3 of Sx1, which contained the seller who 
traded the fewest units overall (shown in panel (b)), average prices are instead closer to the CE than 
the treatment average. Moreover, in Session 4 of iDx1, which contains the two substantial withholders 
shown in panel (c) of Fig. 11, prices were actually higher (i.e. closer to the CE) than in all the other 
sessions of the same treatment. This suggests that to the extent that subjects withhold units, they are 
not more effective than non-withholders in driving prices away from the CE.  
Finding 7 
In the presence of market power, we observe withholding, and some subjects trade far fewer units than 
expected at the CE. However, these subjects do not appear to have been any more effective than other 
subjects at driving prices away from the CE. 
3.5.2. Transaction order 
Suppose that a Dx1 buyer wishes to engage in strategic withholding. This buyer needs to convey an 
intention to withhold to the other side of the market, but this may be difficult when bidding in a thick 
market. For example, if this buyer makes a particularly low bid to signal intent to withhold, the bid may 
be ignored as other non-withholding buyers transact their units. However, if the buyer waits until 
others have sold most of their units, his threat to withhold becomes more transparent. Similar 
behavior might be observed if a buyer simply seeks to maximize his bargaining power within a trading 
period. For instance, suppose a buyer in Dx1 waits to bid until all 12 units of supply that are demanded 
by other buyers have already been sold. This buyer will establish monopsony power over the final 3 
units of supply. 
Note that if one or a few subjects wait to buy until later in the period, we will observe a non-random 
transaction order. Thus, we conclude our examination of the mechanics of market power by asking 
whether the order of transactions was random in our data. 
Consider the following vector, representing the transaction order in a period: [4,1,4,2, … ,3,2]. The ith 
element of this vector tells us who bought the ith unit transacted in period 1 of Session 1 of Dx1. 13 
units were transacted in this period; Buyer 2 bought two units (the 4th and the 13th units traded). 
Imagine that these transactions happened in a different order: [4,1,4,3,⋯ ,2,2]. We have turned Buyer 
2’s earliest transaction into a transaction by Buyer 3, and Buyer 3’s latest transaction into a transaction 
by Buyer 2. In the second transaction ordering, Buyer 2’s average position is 12.5 compared to 8.5 in 
the original. The second vector may be consistent with Buyer 2 strategically waiting until the end of the 
period to buy, as described above. 
To determine whether observed transactions were consistent with random ordering, we again employ 
simulation. For each treatment, market, and session we calculate the empirical average buyer and 
seller positions in the transaction order (e.g. buyer 2’s average position was 8.5 in the example 
discussed above). Then, again for each treatment, market, and session, we randomly shuffle the 
empirical transaction order vector 1000 times. We calculate the mean and standard deviation of buyer 
and seller positions across all 1,000 randomly reshuffled transaction orders. 
We then subtract the empirical average position from the simulated average position and check to see 
if this difference is larger than 1, 2, or 3 standard deviations of the simulated average position in the 
transaction vector. Table 8 presents the results of this exercise. We see very little evidence of non-
random ordering overall; less than 5% of observed transaction orders are more than 2 standard 
deviations (2σ) from the mean. Note that all 9 of the possibly non-random transaction orders were 
observed in the three market power treatments. However, in 6 out of the 9 cases, the market was 
100% efficient (i.e. no units were withheld). This leaves 3 market periods (less than 1%) in which we 
observe possibly non-random transaction order and less than 100% market efficiency.  
Finding 8 
We see little evidence of market power in the form of non-random transaction order. 
Table 8. Transaction order simulations. 
Number of empirical average positions  > Xσ from the simulated mean 
Treatment Session 1σ 2σ 3σ Observations 
Dx1 1 5 3 0 20  
2 3 1 0 19  
3 2 1 0 20  
4 4 0 0 20   
14 (18%) 5 (6%) 0 (0%) 79 
Dx5 1 3 0 0 19  
2 7 0 0 20  
3 5 0 0 19  
4 1 0 0 20   
16 (21%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 78 
Sx1 1 2 0 0 20  
2 6 1 0 20  
3 3 1 0 20  
4 4 1 0 20   
15 (19%) 3 (4%) 0 (0%) 80 
Sx5 1 2 0 0 20  
2 5 0 0 19  
3 3 0 0 20  
4 2 0 0 14   
12 (16%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 73 
iDx1 1 2 0 0 20  
2 5 1 0 20  
3 1 0 0 20  
4 5 0 0 18   
13 (17%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 78 
Notes: Observations are at the subject-period level. Percentages are column sums divided by the number of 
observations. When there are fewer than 80 observations for a treatment it is because a subject bought or sold 
zero units in a period. Note that 4 of the 7 missing subject-period observations from Sx5 are from period 2 of 
Session 4 in which no units were traded. 
4. Conclusion 
We explore the boundaries of the double auction trading institution for non-durable goods. 
Smith (1980) reports non-convergence to the competitive equilibrium in double auctions with 
complete information and a “swastika” supply and demand environment in which all surplus goes to 
one side of the market in equilibrium. We test the robustness of Smith’s conjecture that complete 
information impedes CE convergence in eight new, structurally similar markets, and we are unable to 
reproduce this result. After 5 trading periods, market prices are statistically indistinguishable from the 
CE. 
In the aforementioned markets, it is impossible for a single trader to impact prices by withholding 
capacity; that is, no traders have market power. To provide an even more stringent test of CE 
convergence in the double auction, we also report eight markets in which we introduce symmetric 
market power via a subtle shift in supply (or demand). In these markets, prices consistently deviate 
from the CE, and allocations are consistently less than 100% efficient. This suggests that introducing 
both market power and complete information may hamper CE convergence in the double auction. 
Four additional markets conducted with incomplete information and market power indicate that the 
effect is primarily driven by market power per se and not by complete information. 
As Smith (1982b) notes, “Whenever a theory or an empirical regularity has received replicable support 
from several independent experimental or other empirical studies, and is thereby established as a 
behavioral law with some claim to generality, it is natural to ask whether one can design experiments 
that will test for those extreme or boundary conditions under which the law fails” (p. 942). In this 
tradition, our experiments both bolster previous claims about the striking power of the double auction 
to generate competitive outcomes and highlight boundary conditions under which the institution 
falters. 
Appendix A. Experiment instructions 
Below we include the full instructions for one of our treatments with complete information. Text in 
italics was removed for the incomplete information treatment, and information about the number of 
units available to buyers/sellers was varied according to the treatment condition. All other features of 
the instructions were unchanged across treatments, including text that was emphasized in bold. 
Preliminaries 
Thank you for participating in today’s experiment. Your earnings will depend on your own decisions 
and the decisions of other participants. Your earnings, including your $7.00 show-up fee, will be paid to 
you privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment. Please remain quiet and do not communicate with 
other participants. 
You and the other participants in the experiment have been given either a buyer or a seller record 
sheet. In addition, you have been given an ID card identifying you as either a buyer or a seller. For 
example, Buyer 1 has an ID card marked B1, and Seller 1 has an ID card marked S1. 
Objective 
The experiment is composed of periods in which you will buy and sell units of a fictional good. In each 
period, the buyers’ task is to purchase a unit (or units) from a seller (or sellers). Likewise, the sellers’ 
task is to sell a unit (or units) to a buyer (or buyers). Record sheets contain information about buyers’ 
values and sellers’ costs for units of the good. 
Buyers, think of yourselves as agents working on behalf of the experimenter. Your value (values) 
represents how much money the experimenter will pay you for a unit if you are able to purchase a unit 
during a period. You will earn the difference between your value for a unit and the price at which you 
purchase that unit in a period plus a $0.25 commission per unit purchased. You only receive money 
for units you actually buy, and there is no penalty if you fail to buy a unit. 
Sellers, think of yourselves as producers of the fictional good. Your cost for a unit represents the make-
to-order cost you would incur were you to produce that unit. You will earn the difference between the 
price at which you sell a unit in a period and your cost of producing that unit plus a $0.25 commission 
per unit sold. You only incur costs for units you actually sell, and there is no penalty if you fail to sell a 
unit. 
Buyers may buy, and sellers may sell, multiple units, but everyone must buy or sell units in the order 
they are listed on their record sheet. Also, buyers and sellers can only buy or sell the units for Period 1 
in Period 1 (and for Period 2 in Period 2, and so on). Once a buyer has purchased their 1st unit, they can 
try to buy their 2nd unit at a price that may or may not be the same as that of their 1st unit. A seller 
must sell their 1st unit before they can try to sell their 2nd unit for a price that may or may not be the 
same as what they sold their 1st unit for. 
Buyers can only buy, and sellers can only sell, one unit at a time. In a moment, we will explain how 
trades take place (and where prices come from), but first, please take a look at the sample record 
sheet on the screen. 
Accounting 
The first record sheet is for a hypothetical buyer, and the second record sheet is for a hypothetical 
seller. When a buyer pays a price to a seller, both participants write the price on their record sheet. 
The buyer writes the price in the Price Paid column; the seller writes the price in the Price Received 
column. 
A buyer’s profit on a unit is calculated as:  
Buyer"sProfit = Value− PricePaid + $0.25Commission 
Here is an example to illustrate how a buyer’s profit is calculated in the experiment: If Buyer 1’s 1st unit 
has a value of $10.20, and Buyer 1 buys their first unit at a price of $7.00, then Buyer 1 earns $10.20 
minus $7.00 plus $0.25, or $3.45. 
A seller’s profit on a unit is calculated as 
Seller"sProfit = PriceReceived − Cost + $0.25Commission 
Now consider the same trade from the seller’s point of view: If Seller 1’s 1st unit has a cost of $3.90, 
and Seller 1 sells their first unit at a price of $7.00, then Seller 1 earns $7.00 minus $3.90 plus $0.25, or 
$3.35. 
Notice that a buyer’s profit can be negative if the price that they pay is greater than their value for the 
unit, and a seller’s profit can be negative if the price they receive is less than their cost for the unit! 
Remember, buyers do not receive their value for a unit until they purchase the unit, and sellers do not 
incur their cost for a unit until they sell the unit. Thus, buyers only receive values, and sellers only bear 
costs, when trades take place. 
Buying & selling 
Buyers submit Bids and sellers submit Asks by raising their ID card and, when acknowledged by the 
proctor, saying a price out loud. Please do not shout out your Bid or Ask without being called on. The 
proctor will make an effort to call on buyers and sellers in the order in which they raise their ID cards. 
Each new bid must be higher than the current bid. In other words, if a previous buyer bid $5.00 then 
any new bid must be greater than $5.00. 
Each new ask must be lower than the current ask. If a previous seller asked $9.00 then any new ask 
must be less than $9.00. 
All bids and asks must be in $0.10 increments. For example, if the current bid is $5.00, a new bid must 
be $5.10 or higher. Similarly, if the current ask is $9.00, a new ask must be $8.90 or lower. 
A bid or ask is only valid if it is recognized by the proctor. The proctor will recognize each bid or ask by 
repeating it. For example, if Buyer 1 raises their ID card, the proctor will say “Buyer 1?” If Buyer 1 then 
responds and says “$5.30,” the proctor will say, “Buyer 1 bids $5.30.” This bid will be recorded on the 
screen as an upside-down carrot. If Seller 1 raises their ID card, the proctor will say “Seller 1?” If Seller 
1 then responds and says “$8.40,” the proctor will say, “Seller 1 asks $8.40.” This ask will be recorded 
on the screen as a carrot. 
In addition to submitting bids, a buyer can accept the current ask of a seller at any time. Similarly, a 
seller can accept the current bid of a buyer at any time. For example, if the current ask is $7.00 and 
Buyer 3 raises their ID card, the proctor will say “Buyer 3?” If Buyer 3 responds by saying “Accept 
$7.00,” the proctor will then say, “Buyer 3 accepts $7.00.” 
A trade occurs when a buyer and a seller agree on a price. 
Let us go through an example sequence of bids and asks that lead to a trade:  
• Say that Buyer 1 bids $5.20 
• If Buyer 2 wishes to submit a bid, they must bid $5.30 or more. Say that Buyer 2 bids $5.30 
• Buyer 2’s bid of $5.30 displaces Buyer 1’s bid of $5.20; now any new bid must be greater than 
$5.30 
• Any buyer, including Buyer 1 or Buyer 2, is free to submit a bid greater than the current bid of 
$5.30 
• Say that Seller 1 enters the market by submitting an ask of $8.70 
• If Seller 2 wishes to submit an ask they must submit an ask of $8.60 or less. Say that Seller 2 
asks $8.60 
• Seller 2’s ask of $8.60 displaces Seller 1’s ask of $8.70; now any new asks must be less than 
$8.60 
• Any seller, including Seller 1 or Seller 2, is free to submit an ask less than the current ask of 
$8.60 
• Say that Seller 3 asks $7.00 
• Then Buyer 2 accepts the price of $7.00 
• A trade has occurred 
Recall that whenever a trade occurs, the buyer and the seller of the unit in question each receive a 
commission of $0.25. In our example, Buyer 2 and Seller 3 each record the $7.00 price in the 
appropriate column of their record sheet and then move on to their next unit. After a trade occurs, the 
bid/ask queue is cleared: All buyers and sellers are free to submit new bids and asks at any price. 
Each period will conclude when there are no more bids or asks. When there have been no new bids or 
asks for a spell, the proctor will say, “Going Once, Going Twice...” If there are no new bids or asks, the 
proctor will then announce, “Period Closed,” and the experiment will continue to the next period. 
Between periods, buyers and sellers should total their earnings for all trades in the period that just 
ended. When the next period begins, buyers and sellers can only trade units listed on their record 
sheet for that period. 
There will be 4 buyers and 4 sellers. Each buyer has a value of $17.70 for 4 units. This means that up to 
16 units may be purchased (4 × 4 = 16) in each period. Each seller has a cost of $15.40. Three sellers 
have this cost for 4 units; the fourth seller has this cost for 3 units. This means that up to 15 units may 
be sold (3 × 4 + 1 × 3 = 15) in each period. 
Summary 
The following points summarize the experiment:  
• There will be 4 buyers and 4 sellers 
• Each buyer has a value of $17.70 
(Up to 16 total units may be purchased each period) 
• Each seller has a cost of $15.40 
(Up to 15 total units may be sold each period) 
• Buyer′sProfit = Value− PricePaid + $0.25Commission 
• Seller′sProfit = PriceReceived − Cost + $0.25Commission 
• Raise your ID card to make a bid or an ask 
• Bids and asks must be in $0.10 increments 
• New bids must be greater than the current bid; new asks must be less than the current ask 
Conclusion 
This concludes the instructions. You may review the instructions at any point during the experiment. If 
you have a question that you feel was not adequately answered by the instructions, please raise your 
hand now. We will begin when there are no questions. 
Instructions, Part II 
The experiment will continue exactly as before, except that: 
Each buyer still has a value of $17.70. However, three buyers now have this value for 4 units; the 
fourth buyer has this value for 3 units. 
Each seller now has a cost of $15.40 for 4 units. 
This means that up to 15 units may be purchased (3 × 4 + 1 × 3 = 15) in each period. 
This means that up to 16 units may be sold (4 × 4 = 16) in each period. 
Appendix B. Experiment questionnaire 
Survey 




Canadian                              Other (please specify) 
Is English your first (or native) language? 
Yes                              No (please specify) 
Student Level: 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     Other (please specify) 
Major(s): 
Before today, did you have previous experience bidding in an auction? 
Yes                No 
B1. Survey responses 
Below we report summary statistics from responses to our post-experiment survey. 
Table B1. Summary of survey responses. 












All 21.9 5.3 59 47 37 33 19  
(98%) (99%) (99) (99) (99) (97) (98) 
Dx1 22.2 5.1 69 44 42 48 22  
(100%) (100%) (100) (100) (97) (97) (97) 
Dx5 23.5 6.8 47 34 41 44 16  
(94%) (100%) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) 
Sx1 19.2 3.3 56 56 38 14 27  
(94%) (100%) (100) (100) (100) (91) (94) 
Sx5 21.5 5.4 65 55 26% 26 26  
(97%) (97%) (97) (97) (97) (97) (97) 
iDx1 22.9 5.8 59 45 41 31 6  
(100%) (100%) (100) (97) (100) (100) (100) 
Notes: Response percentages in parenthesis. Student Level is an integer from 1 to 9 (all postgraduates are 
assigned 9). English is the percentage of ‘Yes’ responses to: “Is English your first (or native) language?” Major is 
the percentage of Economics or Business majors. 
Appendix C. Record sheets 
Below we include a copy of the record sheets given to subjects in the experiment. We include one 
example record sheet for a buyer and one for a seller in the Dx1 treatment. 
Record Sheet for Buyer 1 
Period 1 
Unit Value Price Paid Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st 17.70  0.25  
2nd 17.70  0.25  
3rd 17.70  0.25  
4th 17.70  0.25  
 
Period 2 
Unit Value Price Paid Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st 17.70  0.25  
2nd 17.70  0.25  
3rd 17.70  0.25  
4th 17.70  0.25  
 
Period 3 
Unit Value Price Paid Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st 17.70  0.25  
2nd 17.70  0.25  
3rd 17.70  0.25  
4th 17.70  0.25  
 
Period 4 
Unit Value Price Paid Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st 17.70  0.25  
2nd 17.70  0.25  
3rd 17.70  0.25  
4th 17.70  0.25  
 
Period 5 
Unit Value Price Paid Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st 17.70  0.25  
2nd 17.70  0.25  
3rd 17.70  0.25  
4th 17.70  0.25  
Name:  Total earnings: 
 
Record Sheet for Seller 1 
Period 1 
Unit Price Received Cost Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st  15.40 0.25  
2nd  15.40 0.25  
3rd  15.40 0.25  
4th  15.40 0.25  
 
Period 2 
Unit Price Received Cost Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st  15.40 0.25  
2nd  15.40 0.25  
3rd  15.40 0.25  
4th  15.40 0.25  
 
Period 3 
Unit Price Received Cost Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st  15.40 0.25  
2nd  15.40 0.25  
3rd  15.40 0.25  
4th  15.40 0.25  
 
Period 4 
Unit Price Received Cost Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st  15.40 0.25  
2nd  15.40 0.25  
3rd  15.40 0.25  
4th  15.40 0.25  
 
Period 5 
Unit Price Received Cost Commission Profit on Unit 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) − (2) + (3) 
1st  15.40 0.25  
2nd  15.40 0.25  
3rd  15.40 0.25  
4th  15.40 0.25  
Name:  Total earnings: 
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1Cason and Williams (1990) refer to such a supply and demand environment as an “extreme earnings 
inequality” design. As we note, this is true of these markets at the CE, but this label is less descriptive 
of the market configuration than “swastika” design, despite the unfortunate connotations of the latter. 
2See e.g. the opening quote from Jevons (1871) for the classic statement of the view that complete 
information is a necessary condition for CE—so necessary that it might justify coercion. 
3The main institutional difference between these markets was Smith’s use of a trading commission. 
4See Davis and Holt (1994); Davis and Williams (1990), and Wilson (1998) for related work exploring 
market power in the posted-offer market institution. All three studies show evidence that market 
power may impede convergence in posted-offer markets. 
5We chose sessions S1x-S6x from Smith and Williams (1990) (see Table 1) as our baseline because they 
report tight convergence to the CE in incomplete information markets with a trading commission. 
Compare this to sessions S7x and S8x in Smith and Williams (1990) and to Kachelmeier and 
Shehata (1992) which lack a trading commission and in which markets do not quite converge to the CE. 
6One of the authors, who has extensive experience conducting classroom double auctions, played the 
auctioneer role in each session. Every effort was made to ensure that each auction was conducted in a 
similar fashion to all others. In particular, the soft close rule was implemented as consistently as 
possible. 
7When experimental markets became computerized, researchers seem to have switched to using a 
hard close. In some markets such as Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), the rule is a hard close with an 
activity rule than can end a period early if trading activity ceases before the clock expires. Based on our 
experience, we suspect the main role of the hard close is to encourage buyers and sellers to make 
offers that are plausibly acceptable to the other side of the market more quickly. 
8In addition to unavoidable differences in time, place, and subject pool, we vary four other design 
features from Smith and Williams (1990). These are, in order of presumed importance: 1) We use 
hand-run markets as opposed to computerized markets; 2) We permit trading at a loss; 3) We use a 
“soft” market close; and 4) Our payments are scaled to account for inflation and thus our surplus-to-
commission ratio is 0.11 compared to 0.09. The effect of deviation (1) is unclear. With novice traders, 
Williams (1980) reports more rapid convergence in hand-run than in computerized double auctions. 
However, we thank an anonymous referee for noting that novice traders may be more hesitant to 
submit bids and asks in the former institution, and that in 2017, participants may be more comfortable 
with computer interfaces than were Williams’ (1980) participants. The consequence of (2) is to 
effectively shift the supply and demand arrays by $0.25 (the amount of the commission) and to 
increase the surplus available in exchange from $2.30 to $2.80. It is interesting to see whether traders 
realize this and then aggressively attempt to capture this surplus in the market. If traders capture this 
surplus, the imposed $0.10 price increment means that the effective commission per trade will be only 
$0.05 for those on the relatively abundant side of the market. The impact of (3) is less clear and 
perhaps merits future research. In the context of single unit, ascending price auctions, a soft close has 
been shown to increase efficiency by reducing last-second bid “sniping” (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002), 
but it is unclear to what degree that insight transfers to a multi-unit double auction. 
9Wilson (1998) compares complete and incomplete information versions of the posted-offer 
environment with market power studied by Davis and Holt (1994) and shows that incomplete 
information can sometimes have a hysteresis effect in which prices remain supracompetitive even 
after market power has been eliminated. Our design does not vary the presence of market power 
within-subject. 
10Our analysis is robust to removing controls for t from specification (1) and estimating the resulting 
model period-by-period. 
11Recall that we ignore the implicit shifts in the supply and demand curves induced by the $0.25 
commission for each trader. If we estimate model (1) assuming an equilibrium price (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗) that is halfway 
between 17.70 and 17.90 (15.40 and 15.15), the significance of our results does not change. If we 
assume that 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ = 17.95 in our excess demand treatments, we still observe convergence in Dx5 in 
Period 5, and we still do not observe convergence in any Dx1 period. When 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖∗ = 15.15, we do not 
observe convergence in any period in Sx5 or Sx1. 
12While we cannot rule out the possibility that this finding does not extend to computerized, complete 
information double auctions or to hard-close, complete information double auctions, we suspect that it 
does. 
13Compare our design to the supply and demand arrays in Holt et al. (1986) in which 16 units are 
traded at the CE; withholding 1 unit in our x1 treatments reduces efficiency by 6.67% vs. a reduction of 
4% from withholding 2 units (consistent with the exercise of market power) in their design. 
14Note in Fig. 7 that 0 units were traded in period 2 of Session 4 of Sx5. If we exclude this period from 
our efficiency calculation, Sx5 efficiency was 94%. 
15Given that we use a linear model, we get efficiency estimates greater than 100% for some periods in 
the Dx5 treatment. Since we are not making use of these predicted values elsewhere, we do not view 
this as a major issue. 
16Upon seeing this unfold, the experimenter panicked and wondered if he had handed out paperwork 
to subjects containing the wrong supply and demand arrays. No such mistake was made. 
17Note that the division is endogenous to each session and differs across the sessions. This outcome is 
similar to that observed in the so-called “box” design reported in Smith and Williams (1990), which 
employs similar supply and demand arrays to our own but has neither excess supply nor excess 
demand. 
18There is no relationship between total “activity” (bids plus asks) and efficiency in a trading period. No 
correlations are significant at the treatment level except for in Dx5. However, because efficiency was 
less than 100% just twice in 20 periods, this significant, negative correlation coefficient is suspect. 
19Holt et al. (1986) and Davis and Williams (1991) both suggest that subject experience may matter for 
withholding. While none of our subjects had prior laboratory experience in double auctions, we 
surveyed them about their prior auction experience and their university major. No point-biserial 
correlations between either earnings and auction experience, or earnings and economics/business 
major, are significant for any treatment. 
 
